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The  increasing  mobilization  of  non-territorial  groups  raises  questions  about 
European states’ ability to cope with collective claims that cannot be categorized 
under  the  traditional  instruments  of  minority  protection  developed  under  the 
nation-state system. By investigating other legal traditions in which territory is 
not an element of protection, such as the Ottoman millet system, Europe can find 
other available solutions to its current dilemmas. Specifically, this article refers 
to Lebanon, Israel and Iraq, together with some European experiences of non-
territorial self-government, and suggests a model for a modern millet system in 
terms  of  personal  autonomy,  cultural  autonomy,  and  political  representation. 
Personal autonomy implies the introduction of the legal pluralistic paradigm and 
the  selective  opening  of  geo-legal  frontiers  to  foreign  legal  traditions  and 
institutions, as in Israel, the UK, and Germany. Cultural autonomy involves the 
devolution  of  competences  to  local  minority  self-government  bodies  and  the 
involvement  of  minority  members  into  decision-making  organs  vital  to  their 
interests, such as in Iraq, Estonia, and Hungary. Political representation requires 
the  combination  of  both  rigid  and  flexible  tools  for  guaranteeing  effective 
representation and preventing conflict exacerbation. 
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The traditional instruments for protecting minorities, which link rights to a certain 
territory,  inadequately  address  the  claims  of  non-territorial  minorities.  These 
instruments  create  contingent  minorities  in  autonomous  regions  governed  by  a 
minority group and inhabited by members of the state’s dominant group, reject the 
claims of new minorities and exacerbate conflict in multi-ethnic areas. The current 
challenge facing Europe is how to address the demand for recognition and protection 
by groups that are dispersed and not concentrated in one territory, such as Roma and 
Sinti, by migrant groups, such as North Africans, and by religious communities that 
are not yet recognized, such as Muslims. 
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A  non-territorial  option  has  to  be  offered  as  an  effective  solution  for  those 
situations in which territory is not a constitutive part of group identity or may even 
cause ethnic mobilization. As Markusse emphasizes, ‘in general, by utilizing the non-
territorial approach, the inherent problems of the imperfect overlapping of national or 
ethnic  identity  groups  with  populations  of  territories  can  be  effectively  avoided’ 
(Markusse, 2001: 151). 
The demands for non-territorial protection that are currently being advanced 
should be understood in light of the political-historical context in which the state, 
traditionally conceived as the institution that organizes political life, is questioned. 
Specifically,  the  nation-state,  conceived  as  the  political  result  of  one  people,  is 
challenged  by  emerging  multi-cultural  societies  whose  members  aim  to  preserve 
diversity by actively defining their social space within a majority culture (Harrison, 
2002: 36-7). 
During the last fifty years, some European states have progressively adopted 
non-territorial  models  of  protection  in  response  to  the  increasingly  multicultural 
composition of society. In October 2008, the UK Minister of Justice recognized the 
jurisdiction of Islamic courts as arbitrators in cases of marriage and divorce. In 1990, 
the Hungarian Parliament passed a law that guarantees representation for national and 
ethnic  minorities  in  both  local  and  national  political  bodies.  In  the  1950s,  the 
Netherlands established a complex social system, known as verzuiling (van Doorn, 
1956), which provided different “pillars” of social action for Protestant, Catholic, and 
secular  citizens  and  is  still  considered  an  effective  solution  for  the  integration  of 
Muslim  citizens  (Rath  et  al.,  2004).  Given  the  significant  level  of  Muslim 
immigration, many European countries have created consultative organs for political 
representation and dialogue with Muslim minorities, including migrants and nationals, 
such as the Consulta Islamica in Italy, the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in 
France,  the  Comisión  Islámica  de  España  in  Spain,  and  the  Muslim  Council  of 
Britain. However, there is not yet a clear approach regarding the policy of recognition 
and the degree of autonomy that should be guaranteed to non-territorial groups. 
The literature on non-territorial protection of minorities has analyzed theoretical 
and  practical  solutions  of  cultural  autonomy  (Nimni,  2005),  with  historical 
consideration of the millet as the major system of non-territorial autonomy developed 
in the Ottoman Empire (Braude and Lewis, 1982). However, less heed was given to JEMIE 2013, 1 
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contemporary adaptations of the millet system in Middle Eastern countries, which can 
represent a potential source of inspiration for European legislators. 
Contemporary adaptations of the Ottoman millet system, including Lebanon, 
Israel, and Iraq mentioned in this article, identify three aspects of protection: personal 
autonomy, whereby one is subject to the legal system of the ethno-religious group 
s/he belongs to; cultural autonomy, whereby groups can collectively exercise cultural 
rights; and political representation of minority groups (Quer, 2010). Non-territorial 
forms  of protection that have been recently adopted in  the West  can be similarly 
categorized: British Islamic courts are an example of personal autonomy, cultural and 
minority councils in Estonia and Hungary are examples of cultural autonomy, and 
minority councils in Hungary and Islamic councils in other European countries are 
examples of political representation. 
As  Palermo  and  Woelk  observe,  the  millet  system  is  a  ‘very  controversial 
technique of differential promotion of groups that makes legal systems which adopt it 
resemble multinational systems (in that it stably institutionalizes groups), although 
they structurally distinguish themselves from these, in that the institutionalization is 
limited to certain purposes’ (Palermo and Woelk, 2008: 47). The millet developed 
under Ottoman rule to secure Islamic hegemony over non-Muslim minorities under 
Ottoman sovereignty. Historically, this system did not envisage the positive political 
inclusion of minorities into Ottoman society; rather, it perpetuated traditional Islamic 
tenets of domination onto groups of different faiths. Precisely because it emanates 
from the Eastern legal tradition—where identity is defined in terms of religion rather 
than ethnicity, and familial allegiance rather than national (Lewis, 2010) —the millet 
is a system constructed on identity and not on territory. Hence, the millet has evolved 
as  a  system  of  non-territorial  management  of  diverse  groups,  which  unitarily 
addresses  personal  autonomy,  cultural  autonomy,  and  political  representation. 
Moreover, it has survived Ottoman rule and is still applied in contemporary Middle 
Eastern  legal  systems.  By  comparing  selected  contemporary  millet  systems
1  and 
European examples of non -territorial autonomy as models of reference for self -
government  arrangements,  a  general  model  of  non -territorial  protection  can  be 
outlined  in  terms  of  personal   autonomy,  cultural  autonomy,  and  political 
representation. Quer, De-Territorializing Minority Rights in Europe 
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With regard to personal autonomy, the UK’s recognition of Islamic courts has 
dramatically changed the long-established Western legal tradition of territoriality by 
introducing  the  idea  that  one  may  be  subject  to  a  legal  system  produced  by  an 
authority other than the state (MacEoin, 2009: 73) whereas, in Middle Eastern and 
African  countries,  the  coexistence  of  multiple  legal  systems  is  a  feature  of  legal 
pluralistic  systems.  Moreover,  the  judicial  recognition  of  legal  institutions  that 
originate  from  other  legal  systems,  through  what  this  paper  defines  as  “selective 
recognition”, also shows that Western legal systems are increasingly becoming plural 
(Shah, 2005: 43-66). 
With regard to cultural autonomy, European and Middle Eastern solutions show 
that the accommodation of collective rights through cultural autonomy models may 
lead to group segregation, while it is at the same time necessary that the system keeps 
societal  unity  by  institutionalizing  a  neutral  over-communal  space  with  which  all 
groups may identify in order to guarantee citizens’ loyalty to the state (Tully, 1995: 
197-8). 
With  regard  to  political  representation,  the  necessity  to  guarantee  minority 
groups  a  certain  role  in  the  decision-making  process  often  diverges  from  societal 
conflict management and prevention (Töpperwein, 2004: 40-2). Rigid solutions, such 
as ethnic power-sharing or fixed seats in decision-making institutions, are disputably 
sustainable in the long term (Woelk, 2008: 97-9), while more flexible solutions may 
not satisfy communal claims for protection (Wolff, 2008).  
As has been noted, a number of European systems have introduced models of 
non-territorial  accommodation  for  managing  diversity  that,  nonetheless,  do  not 
comprehensively address the claims of minorities for protection regarding personal 
autonomy  (advanced  mainly  by  new  minorities),  cultural  autonomy  and  political 
representation. Hazardous as it may appear for its apparent extraneousness to Western 
legal and political traditions, the millet system as a model of diversity management 
offers  available  solutions  to  contemporary  multicultural  Europe  in  terms  of  both 
collective rights accommodation and formulation of minority and majority groups’ 
interests. Indeed, the millet originates from a different legal and political tradition and 
therefore comprises aspects that may be incompatible with the Western democratic 
tradition. However, as this article shows, this system is a model that could be adapted 
in Europe for the systemic accommodation of non-territorial claims for communal JEMIE 2013, 1 
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protection. Moreover, this  article considers the  complex debate on the  concept  of 
nation-state  and  the  extent  to  which  it  can  enact  effective  minority  policies  by 
maintaining  a  majority  culture.  It  argues  that  multiple  identities 
(group/nation/state/Europe)  can  be  institutionalized  through  the  adaptation  of  the 
millet  system  by  creating  a  multi-level  identification  system 
(communal/national/supranational) in which majority and minority groups’ interests 
ultimately converge. 
 
1. Personal autonomy and legal pluralism 
Among recent claims for protection, the demand advanced by Islamic communities in 
the  UK,  Belgium  and  Germany  to  recognize  shari’a  (Islamic  law)  courts  roused 
controversial reactions. The problems of non-European cultural practices by migrants 
in  Europe  that  include  legal  institutions  unknown  to  the  West,  as  well  as  the 
circulation of judicial decisions on specific legal institutions that are not recognized 
by all European states, question the capability of the territorial application of law to 
cope with current conflicts among different legal systems. Particularly, the application 
of  family  law  is  problematic,  since  foreign  legal  institutions,  such  as  polygamy, 
involve  moral  considerations  rooted  in  the  fundamental  principles  of  social 
organization. 
This problem is not a novelty in legal literature, which has analyzed the conflict 
of laws in family law matters in cases of colonial legal systems and their effects on 
colonized  legal  practices  (Hooker,  1975);  nor  is  this  issue  a  novelty  in  countries 
characterized by a high degree of immigration—where territorialists, who argue in 
favour of the supremacy of the law of the land, oppose internationalists, who, on the 
contrary, argue in favor of partial recognition of foreign institutions. These disputes 
are based on the conflict of laws, which regulates both the place of adjudication and 
the  applicable  law,  and  on  the  notion  of  public  order,  whereby  states  impose 
restrictions  on  the  recognition  of  foreign  legal  institutions  based  on  constitutional 
values and moral considerations (ordre public). However, even in the US during the 
1920s, it was pointed out that ‘all problems in the Conflict of Laws reduce themselves 
in the last analysis to the question whether under a particular set of circumstances 
sound policy demands that the forum apply the local or some “foreign” rule of law’ 
(E.G.L., 1923: 473). Quer, De-Territorializing Minority Rights in Europe 
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Simple  non-recognition  of  foreign  legal  traditions  does  not  seem  to  be  an 
available  solution  either,  since  their  rejection  does  not  imply  conformation  to 
European standards by new minorities that are reluctant to abandon their traditions. 
Furthermore,  non-recognition  may  lead  to  discrimination  against  those  vulnerable 
groups that are oppressed by traditional cultures and not protected by Western legal 
systems that do not recognize the legal nature of the institutions that infringe their 
fundamental rights—such as the succession rights of the second wife, immigration 
rights  of polygamous children, and patrimonial rights  of repudiated women. As a 
consequence, 
official bans on social practices such as polygamy are ill-advised and drive the 
phenomenon underground. The risk of abuse here is great, as is the potential 
vulnerability of women and children who may simply be abandoned without a 
divorce recognized under the personal law of the parties and without recourse to 
official legal fora for remedy. If anything, the official law exacerbates the weaker 
legal position of women and children, often dividing families across continents 
by disrespecting their choices (Shah, 2003: 398). 
If the recognition of traditional legal systems in a model of personal autonomy is not 
desirable for the above-mentioned reasons, the situations that result from the legal 
acts produced in different countries or in virtue of different legal traditions cannot be 
disregarded by Western legal systems when this leads to neglect of the protection of 
fundamental rights. Hence, non-recognition is not an available solution. 
Beyond the question of appropriateness stemming from the recognition of legal 
institutions  regulating  cultural  practices  considered incompatible  with  fundamental 
principles,  such  as  polygamy,  the  fundamental  problem  consists  of  individual 
protection of vulnerable groups—e.g. polygamous children’s succession rights. While 
no general approach has been developed, ‘continental writers have attempted to bring 
the  cases  arising  from  polygamy  within  their  general  theories  concerning  the 
application of “foreign” law and their notions of “public order”, but no agreement 
exists in the results reached’ (E.G.L., 1923: 477). Indeed: 
[These  issues]  cannot  be  determined  by  any  general  formula,  but  demand  a 
careful consideration of the facts of each particular case and of the conflicting 
policies involved,  with  a view  of  discovering  whether the recognition  of  the 
“foreign” law can be brought into harmony with the legal order of the forum 
(ibid).  
 
So  far,  two  approaches  seem  to  emerge:  the  direct  recognition  of  foreign  legal 
systems,  which  are  integrated  within  the  national  legal  space;  and  selective JEMIE 2013, 1 
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recognition of foreign legal institutions,  which are employed for the protection of 
society’s vulnerable groups. 
 
1.1 Direct recognition of foreign legal systems: the UK model 
With regard to the direct recognition of foreign legal systems, the UK example is 
emblematic. After decades of refusing and then partially recognizing foreign legal 
institutions of family law, the British legal system has increasingly adopted a positive 
approach  towards  Muslim  communities.  Both  statutory  law  and  jurisprudence  on 
immigration issues vacillated over the recognition of polygamous marriages, but this 
has  not  impeded  the  Muslim  minority  from  perpetuating  legal  traditions  that  are 
considered repugnant to the Western eye. As Shah has shown in analyzing the attitude 
of the British legal system towards polygamy as practiced by Muslim immigrants, 
ethnic  minorities  have  not  remained  passive  recipients  of  official  dictates. 
Rather,  there  is  evidence of  their  reliance  on  their own  cultural  resources  to 
secure acceptable outcomes for themselves, and they are often able to negotiate 
between different legal levels in order to do so, thereby calling into question the 
claims about the dominance of the official legal system (Shah, 2003: 398). 
The resistance of ethnic minorities to the banning of certain cultural practices, as well 
as other policy considerations, has led to the decision to integrate Islamic law into the 
British legal system. This situation resembles the cases of Lebanon (Dib, 1975: 13-28) 
and  Israel  (Edelman,  1994:  48-99),  where  ethno-religious  communities  are 
autonomous  in  regulating  family  law  matters  according  to  their  legal  traditions. 
However, while in Lebanon and Israel religious laws are an integral part of the law of 
the state, in Britain Islamic law operates at the arbitration level. This difference is 
fundamental  in  considering  practical  consequences  related  to  the  application  of 
religious law and the respect for human rights. Moreover, the degree of autonomy 
accorded to groups defines the state as multi-national or multi-ethnic. By recognizing 
religious courts as state courts, all groups are equal members of society in terms of 
legal parity, whereby religious law is the law of the state, which considers the values 
of the single groups as its own values. On the contrary, when the status of religious 
law is treated as inferior, and religious courts are (only) arbitration courts, the state 
qualifies  as  ‘promotional’,  in  the  sense  that  it  actively  promotes  minority  rights, 
through the adoption and implementation of policies that recognizes a special status 
for the minority.  Quer, De-Territorializing Minority Rights in Europe 
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The Lebanese case shows that a high degree of autonomy freezes legal sub-
systems into mono-blocs that are indifferent to any external influence (Takieddine, 
2004: 34); therefore, arrangements based on total autonomy exclude the possibility of 
the  general  legal  system  correcting  those  practices  that  are  incompatible  with  the 
fundamental principles of the state. 
A further singular case is the Greek sub-system of personal autonomy in Thrace. 
As a vestige of the Ottoman millet, the Greek system recognizes both personal and 
traditional communal autonomy for the historical Muslim minority in Thrace. The 
special arrangements that regulate the status of Thracian Muslims are contained in the 
1914 Act no. 145 and in the 1920 Act no. 2345, both included in the agreements with 
Turkey that followed Greek independence. The Greek case has been criticized for 
creating “legal segregation” and for banning Thrace Muslims from civil litigation in 
family law matters because of personal autonomy (Tsistselikis, 2004). Rather than the 
direct application of Islamic law, the flaw of this system appears to be the denial of 
state courts’ scrutiny over the decisions of religious courts, which may not be familiar 
or inclined to apply the same legal standards of civil courts in terms of human rights 
standards and equality. 
In this respect, the Israeli legal system shows that the supervision of a higher 
judicial  body  that  scrutinizes  the  decisions  of  religious  courts,  specifically  the 
Supreme Court, constitutes a remedy to the infringement of fundamental rights that 
stems from the application of religious law (Navot, 2007: 142-5). Moreover, in Israel, 
the co-existence of both secular and religious laws on family matters provides the 
opportunity to choose which court is considered more convenient to the belief of the 
applicants—secular or religious judges—and guarantees both the principle of personal 
autonomy and respect for fundamental rights. Yet, the status of religious courts as 
state courts, thus of equal rank as civil courts, may lead to the legitimization of those 
internal restrictions, defined as discriminatory practice of group culture (Kymlicka, 
1995: 35-6), that secular legal systems normally reject. 
Hence,  the  UK  model  may  be  considered  an  improvement  of  contemporary 
millet systems: such an arrangement guarantees the opportunity for Islamic minorities 
to  refer  to  religious  courts  and  then  to  perpetuate  traditional  cultural  practices; 
simultaneously,  by  guaranteeing  state  supervision  over  judicial  decisions,  this JEMIE 2013, 1 
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arrangement is  capable  of correcting the  contradictions of the system  in terms  of 
respect of fundamental rights 
However,  the  activity  of  monitoring  religious  courts’  decisions  may  lead  to 
active  scrutiny  rather  than  mere  supervision,  resulting  in  the  imposition  of  civil 
interpretations on religious issues. Indeed, civil impositions may not take due account 
of religious aspirations and needs, leading to the infringement of religious rights and 
freedoms.  For  instance,  preclusion  from  undertaking  a  certain  role  imposed  on  a 
woman by a religious court may be considered as discrimination against her, while 
perfectly consistent with religious principles and values. The gap between values and 
visions may lead to a certain tension between civil and religious legal communities. 
As has been observed with regard to Israel, secular legal discourse often bears the 
main  responsibility  for  the  poor  reputation  of  religious  judges  (Dichovsky,  1986-
1988). 
The necessity to connect religious sub-systems and the general legal system of 
the state is confirmed by the development of religious law towards liberal standards. 
As Pearl and Menski argue, UK practice has led to the creation of ‘a new form of 
shari’a,  English  Muslim  law  or  angrezi  shariat’  as  the  result  of  ‘individual  and 
community strategies [that] have led to the development of a new hybrid’ (Pearl and 
Menski, 1998: 58), which seeks legal solutions within the Islamic law framework that 
are compatible with British social standards (Tibi, 2006).
2 
Notwithstanding this tendency towards Europeanization, it remains debatable 
how convenient it is for European states to open the borders of their jurisdictions to 
other legal traditions. At least three problems stem from this change: the risk to 
legitimize internal restrictions, the scarce degree of familiarity of Islamic judges with 
European legal standards, and the paradox of the multicultural migrant who re -
discovers cultural practices often banned in his/her country of origin (Sbai, 2010: 85-
7). As for internal restrictions, the legal system that accepts different legal traditions 
has to set clear limits on what it is likely to recognize and what it is likely to ban 
according to its fundamental principles. It is impossible to set general standards, since 
certain practices may conform to human rights, whereas others may be disregarded as 
violations  of  fundamental  freedoms.  A  case -to-case  approach  based  on  mutual 
understanding and compromise seems to be the best option in order to adapt new legal 
traditions to Western values and let them re -elaborate cultural practices in a liberal-Quer, De-Territorializing Minority Rights in Europe 
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democratic sense. To enable this process, not only do states have to define principles 
for  opening  their  jurisdictional  frontiers,  but  also  minority  leaders  have  to  be 
acquainted with the culture of the state of residence. As for the familiarity of Islamic 
judges with European legal standards, the necessity of educational programmes on 
constitutional and human rights laws is confirmed by some state initiatives, such as in 
Spain and Germany (Der Spiegel, 2010). 
Finally, the recognition of Islamic law in Europe may lead to the paradox of 
multiculturalism,  whereby  certain  cultural  practices,  banned  in  countries  where 
migrants  come  from,  are  revitalized  in  Europe  by  virtue  of  the  right  to  cultural 
diversity. As Sbai argues,  
if we consider what happens in the countries of origin, we notice modernization 
and  change,  even  within  the  institutions;  these  novelties  clash  with  the 
traditionalism  attached  to  the  past  proper  of  immigrants  on  the  European 
Continent, who are isolated and unaware of the evolution in their countries (Sbai, 
2010: 87). 
 
1.2 Selective recognition of foreign legal institutions: the German model 
With regard to the selective recognition of foreign legal institutions, the case-by-case 
approach seems to be the most appropriate to protect vulnerable groups, including 
women, children, and sexual minorities, who risk being discriminated against even in 
promotional  legal  systems  that  do  not  recognize  certain  legal  institutions  of  their 
original countries. 
This is the case of Germany, where shari’a is applied by civil courts in the 
process of recognition of foreign judgments and in private law, including family law 
contracts or commercial contracts (Rohe, 2004). Specifically, German civil courts do 
not directly recognize foreign legal institutions, but recognize the factual situations 
that ensue in favour of individuals whose rights are violated by these institutions, such 
as  a  polygamous wife’s succession rights, the reunion  of polygamous families  on 
humanitarian basis, and a divorce settlement agreed on the basis of Islamic law.
3 
This option avoids the problem of  legitimizing cultural practices contrary to 
fundamental rights in that international private law per mits the “filtering” of legal 
institutions compatible with the European legal systems through the notion of public 
order. Simultaneously, the process  of  recognizing  foreign decisions  cannot  simply 
disregard foreign legal institutions considered repugnant to European legal culture. JEMIE 2013, 1 
86 
 
Indeed,  the  duty  to  respect  fundamental  rights  should  also  apply  to  those 
situations  in  which  the  violation  of  human  rights  originates  from  foreign  legal 
institutions that European systems do not recognize. The higher interest at stake here 
is the protection of vulnerable groups, such as women and children, who have to be 
guaranteed protection even though the legal system does not recognize the foreign 
norms that violated their rights, because simple non-recognition would prejudice their 
already weak position by leaving them without any rights. 
Besides  Islamic  minority  claims,  a  similar  condition  concerns  same-sex 
marriages  in  Europe.  Since  certain  states  do  not  recognize  the  institution  of 
homosexual  unions,  the  selective  recognition  of  legal  institutions  could  solve  the 
problems that ensue from legal situations that, on the one hand are generated within a 
legal system that recognizes homosexual unions and, on the other hand, have to be 
solved  in  another  system  that  rejects  that  institution—for  instance,  the  rights  of 
children born to a homosexual family married in Sweden and residing in Italy. 
However,  this  option  does  not  define  the  limits  of  recognition  and  its 
operational  practice.  The  judges  with  whom  such  petitions  are  filed  may  not  be 
acquainted  with  Islamic  law  or  with  the  implications  of  their  possible  decisions. 
Therefore, education on Islamic law and training on the relations between Islamic and 
European laws is necessary, in dialogue with Islamic legal experts in Europe. This 
“task-force” of legal dialogue would increase the potential for mutual understanding 
on  values  and  norms  and  could  be  the  first  step  that  opens  the  way  for  the 
institutionalization of Islamic law in religious arbitration courts as in the UK. As Rohe 
emphasizes, 
sharī‛a  in  Europe  would  mean  to  define  sharī‛a  rules  for  Muslims  here  in 
accordance with the indispensable values of democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law governing European legal orders. Within the framework of these 
orders,  Muslims  have  to  be  enabled  not  only  theoretically  to  practice  their 
believes.  Thus,  all  Europeans  should  remember  that  freedom  of  religion  and 
therefore  religious  pluralism  is  an  integral  part  of  the  liberal  European 
constitutions, and that everybody who is willing to respect the rule of the land 
should enjoy this freedom (Rohe, 2004: 348). 
In this sense, legal pluralism has to be considered as a process and not as a defined 
solution to be introduced into European legal orders. Before states are ready to open 
their  legal  frontiers  to  different  legal  systems,  they  have  to  be  acquainted  with 
relevant  foreign values  and norms  and,  in  particular, they  have to  understand the 
implications of such a change. In this respect, dialogue may lead to legal exchange Quer, De-Territorializing Minority Rights in Europe 
87 
 
and to institutional legal differentiation within the European systems. The desirability 
of this radical change is not a question anymore, since the process has already started. 
What, on the contrary, has to be considered is the way this process is developing and 
the goals to be attained (Ekardt, 2005). 
 
2. Cultural autonomy 
The principle of legal dialogue leads to the issue of bridging cultural communities in 
terms of coexistence, compromise, and shared values and principles. In this respect, a 
variety of solutions adopted by European legal systems show that active efforts to 
accommodate  minorities  is  an  antidote  to  the  political  mobilization  of  groups 
(McGarry,  O'Leary,  and  Simeon,  2008).  The  territorial  solutions  that  have 
traditionally been adopted should be integrated with non-territorial solutions. 
The  Estonian  model  of  autonomous  communities  resembles  the  communal 
cultural autonomy of millet systems,
4 where ethno-religious groups autonomously run 
educational and cultural institutions ,  as well as health and  religious  organizations 
aiming to primarily serve the interests of the minority, although  also open to general 
society.  As in the  millet  system,  Estonian  cultural  communities  can  act  as  legal 
persons  in  order  to  pursue  their  interests  by  a  special  regulation  of  their  legal 
personality  that  differs  from  the  one  of  private  associations  (Eide,  Greni,  and 
Lundberg, 1998: 254-7). The introduction of non-territorial instruments for protecting 
minorities  can  also  guarantee  the  appropriate  protection  of  cultural  communities 
according  to  the  number  of  members  and  financial  capabilities  of  the  institutions 
mandated to enact policies of protection (Krizsa, 2000: 260). For instance, regarding 
educational policies, separate schools may be possible for large communities, while 
small communities can  be accommodated through separate curricula. Again,  large 
communities could run their own institutions and support small communities in order 
to guarantee the enjoyment of collective rights. 
The millet legal systems, where communities enjoy a large degree of autonomy, 
also raises concerns on the negative potential of such autonomy through segregation 
and  incompatibility  with  the  dominant  community.  The  millet  system  guarantees 
groups  the  autonomy  to  run  educational,  cultural,  and  health  institutions  in  the 
minority language, reflective of the  minority culture, and based on  the minority’s 
cultural and religious principles. In such systems, groups act as states by providing JEMIE 2013, 1 
88 
 
their members services according to a certain set of cultural, traditional, and religious 
principles,  which,  in  terms  of  group  self-government,  are  equivalent  to  the 
constitutional foundations of states. Hence, the risk of creating separate social groups, 
common to all autonomy arrangements, may lead to confrontational relations between 
minority groups and majorities. 
Autonomy  inevitably  preserves  and  develops  non-ruling  communities,  but  it 
cannot  turn  into  a  means  of  self-determination  for  minorities  when  this  is 
incompatible with the existence of the state and with the fundamental values of the 
ruling community. The case of Lebanon clearly shows that an excessive degree of 
autonomy leads to the isolation of communities and creates a multicultural society 
that  is  not  a  melting  pot,  but  rather  a  society  in  which  different  cultures  live 
separately, in parallel to one another (Rabbath, 1982: 117). This lack of connection 
among  communities,  Tibi  claims,  creates  instability  in  that  communities  do  not 
identify with a supra-communal form of common membership (Tibi, 2002: 178-81). 
The need to protect minorities as a duty of liberal democracy has to be balanced 
with the necessity of preserving a public space in which communities act as members 
of a common society. Linguistic, religious, ethnic, and cultural specificities cannot be 
crystallized in identities that are impermeable to adaptation. Hence, the promotional 
attitude of states has to correspond with a genuine will for integration on the side of 
minorities,  who  pursue  the  goal  of  cultural  preservation  in  self-governing 
arrangements  but  are  ready  to  share  the  values  and  principles  of  the  dominant 
community  (Marko,  2006:  510).  This  mutual  compromise  on  both  sides,  of  the 
dominant  and  the  non-ruling  communities,  can  be  attained  by  an  agreement  on 
common values and principles that constitute the social pact of the state, which is the 
result of negotiation and dialogue. 
In practice, dialogue means active participation of the state in cultural issues of 
interest to minorities, such as supervision of the Ministry of Education on educational 
curricula in Israel and the inclusion of minorities into the decision-making process 
(Lapidoth  and  Ahimeir,  1999:  25).  This  means  that  states  should  guarantee  the 
political participation of minorities, the third aspect of the millet system. While this 
issue is the focus of the next section, one more question arises regarding negotiation: 
the involvement of elites and leaders. Quer, De-Territorializing Minority Rights in Europe 
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In the negotiation process, leaders who advance the interests of their groups 
represent minorities. In order to conduct effective negotiations among groups, leaders 
should have an in-depth knowledge of the ruling community’s culture and should be 
acquainted with the constitutional values and principles of the state of residence. To 
this  purpose,  educational  training  for  minority  leaders  and  elites  is  the  first  step 
towards  effective  dialogue  and  compromise,  such  as  educational  programs  in 
universities for Muslim clerics (Heneghan, 2010).
5 In addition, the hosting state and 
institutions should be sensible and open to  resident minorities and, specifically, to 
their culture and needs. This is not just a matter of benevolent  acceptance, but it also 
means  fully  understanding  the  common  value s  over  which  to  develop  the 
accommodation of minority claims according to the standards of the ruling majority. 
In terms of legal pluralism, this is evidently even more necessary if one thinks that the 
hosting state has to deal with foreign legal institutions and customs. Thus, a Western 
judge will be able to scrutinize a religious court decision only if s/he thoroughly 
understands the legal aspects and implications of that institution, and thus  is capable 
of finding the appropriate way to limit its application according to Western standards.  
 
3. Political representation: the millet as a means of diversity management 
Appropriate  representation  of  minority  groups  is  necessary  to  attain  the  effective 
protection of cultural rights. The recognition of minority groups by the state is not per 
se sufficient if they do not have an actual say in the management of policies in order 
to achieve their goals. The Iraqi system is an example of this, since the constitution 
recognizes collective rights, but the legal system practically deprives minorities of 
rights since they are not guaranteed representation in those institutions in charge of 
implementing  policies  relating  to  minority  rights  (Anderson  and  Stansfield,  2005: 
373-6). 
Inclusion into the decision-making process can be attained in different ways, 
including  ethnic  power-sharing,  as  in  Lebanon,  or  de  facto  representation  and 
particular forms of representation in specific areas of interest, as in Israel. The former 
case shows that rigid arrangements exacerbate conflict because groups are prone to 
maximize  their  goals  rather  than  seek  compromise.  The  latter  case  comprises  a 
combination of specific representation in areas of interest to minorities, including the 
educational system and the management of linguistic and religious affairs, with de JEMIE 2013, 1 
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facto representation of minorities in the legislative, executive, and judiciary bodies. 
This combination of rigid and elastic models of representation reduces conflict when 
the relationship between minority and majority is confrontational (Barzilai, 2003: 95). 
Specifically, representation cannot meet the demands of a minority that not only does 
not identify with the state because it feels the existence of the state is incompatible 
with its national aspirations, but also actively pursues national goals that are not in 
conformity with the constitutional principles of the state of residence (Kremnitzer, 
2004: 161-8). 
In this respect, the historical model of de-localizing minority councils in pre-
independent  Lebanon  (Nohra,  1988:  41-4)  resembles  the  Hungarian  model  of  a 
representation system—reflective of Renner’s national cultural autonomy—whereby 
minorities are guaranteed representation in institutions through inclusive instruments, 
such  as  power-sharing  at  the  local  level,  whereas,  at  the  central  level,  they  are 
guaranteed selective representation in specific areas of interest (Walsh, 2000). This 
model  is  based  on  the  fragmentation  of  governance  (multi-level)  within  the 
institutional hierarchy (Bogdandy, 2007). 
In  this  respect,  various  European  legal  systems  have  opted  for  the 
institutionalization  of  dialogue  between  states  and  minorities.  In  some  cases 
institutionalization  is  informal  and  minority  representatives  negotiate  with  state 
institutions without legal means that guarantee them actual power, such as the Islamic 
Councils in Italy and France. The institutionalization of dialogue can lead to mutual 
knowledge  and  understanding  by  empowering  minorities  to  influence  the  central 
institutions and ruling groups, as well as preventing them from pursuing goals that do 
not conform to the fundamental principles of the state. 
This  model  constitutes  an  option  for  minorities  that  have  engaged  in 
confrontational relationships with their states of residence. Indeed, such institutions 
offer the possibility to mutually define vital interests and to compromise negotiable 
positions. It is not by chance that Islamic Councils have developed in the historical 
context of Islamic mobilization vis-à-vis hosting states.
6 In addition, these institutions 
can  hinder groups from  autonomously  pursuing their  own  interests by paralyzing 
political  life.  With  limited  powers  guaranteed  to  advance  communal  interests, 
minority groups are motivated to negotia te, while in cases of consolidated powers, 
groups may trigger conflict by exploiting the institutions designed to protect them and Quer, De-Territorializing Minority Rights in Europe 
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negatively  affecting  the  whole  political  system,  as  Lebanon  and  Belgium  show 
(Mnookin and Verbeke, 2009). 
 Examples of millet solutions include the institutionalization of legal pluralism 
in the late Ottoman Empire, adopted by the modern Middle Eastern states after the 
First World War. The Ottoman millet developed self-governments for ethno-religious 
communities  in  terms  of  personal  status,  cultural  autonomy  and  fiscal  autonomy. 
Communities were organized in partially autonomous bodies, which ‘in some ways 
replaced the direct authority of the Sultan’s government, even though the locus of 
ultimate  authority  was  never  in  doubt’  (Davison,  1963:  12).  Therefore,  Ottoman 
citizens were subject to the authority of the ethno-religious community to which they 
belonged for matters of personal status (marriage and divorce), tax levies (for the 
government of communal activities), and educational services. 
Modern Middle Eastern systems have adapted the Ottoman millet in order to 
cope with diversity, defined first as religious communal identity, or ethno-religious 
identity. The most developed examples of contemporary millet are: Lebanon, Israel, 
and Iraq. 
Lebanon  provides  the  example  of  a  political-confessional  pact  that 
institutionalized not only personal autonomy, but also political representation. Indeed, 
Lebanon is based on a paradigm of political confessionalism, whereby power-sharing 
runs through ethno-religious lines (called ta’ifiya); different religious communities are 
united by a syncretic nationalism that is designed to keep the societal basis united 
(Rondot, 1968). Israel is an example of liberal democracy where the millet is limited 
to  personal  status,  whereby  religious  courts  administrate  matters  of  family  law, 
guaranteeing the perpetuation of religious practices through limited autonomy. The 
state  recognizes  12  religious  communities  (including  Jews,  Muslims,  Druze,  and 
several  Christian  confessions),  which  enjoy  a  certain  degree  of  autonomy  in 
governing  communal  property  and  communal  religious,  educational,  and  cultural 
services. 
As for Iraq, in November 2008, the national parliament passed the ‘Provincial 
Assemblies Law’ on the representation of members belonging to ethnic or religious 
minorities at the local legislative and executive bodies (including Christians, Yezidis, 
Sabaens, and Shabaks), in the attempt to manage the complex diversity characterizing 
Iraqi society, which has been divided by religious and political conflicts. In Iraq the JEMIE 2013, 1 
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millet system proves to be particularly effective in protecting minority interests that 
go beyond conflict among ruling communities, including Kurds and Arabs, as well as 
Sunni and Shi’a. In this regard, small minorities in Iraq benefit from the millet system 
because they can preserve their identity despite their small numbers by pursuing their 
interests at the local level. 
Still, the focal issue is: why are states willing to negotiate with minorities that 
are perceived as hostile? Inversely, why should a minority that does not identify with 
the state of residence be willing to engage in dialogue with state institutions? Beyond 
the recognition of collective rights at the local level, which would lead to collective 
satisfaction, another answer is the institutionalization of dialogue. In constitutional 
terms, the instruments of representation allow for the actual exercise of constitutional 
power, conceived as the power to create and revise constitutional acts and facts. The 
first  constitutional  fact  is  the  social  pact,  whereby  citizens  accept  to  live  in  a 
community that guarantees certain rights and imposes certain duties. In a post-modern 
sense,  minority  representation  should  be  considered  as  the  exercise  of  political 
participation rights by minorities, who can pursue their interests by directly defining 
the terms of the social contract and, consequently, of the societal space (Gesellschaft). 
The empowerment of minorities in terms of defining the constitutional social 
contract requires, however, a partial modification of the notion that defines a state as 
the institutional expression of one people, and as the homeland, protected by borders, 
of one nation, according to the principle of external self-determination. In particular, 
this  holds  true  considering  the  current  pressure  that  borders  are  under  and  the 
consequent increasing inability to define legal, economic and political spaces that are 
detaching  themselves  from  spatial  territories  causing  a  progressive  process  of  de-
territorialization (Papastergiadis, 2000: 115-6). 
In this respect, the opening of geo-legal frontiers by recognizing foreign legal 
traditions implies the questioning of the nature of states as institutional expression of 
one  dominant  people—i.e.,  the  concept  of  nation-state.  If  European  integration 
challenges the organization of nation-states by creating supra-national institutions that 
limit states’ sovereignty, the minority question challenges the cultural mission of the 
states  that  are  the  homeland  of  one  culture.  In  this  respect,  the  idea  of  Europe 
constitutes a lifeline for nation-states. As Weiler emphasizes, Europe is not about the 
creation  of  a  new  nation;  being  European  does  not  imply  leveling  out  different Quer, De-Territorializing Minority Rights in Europe 
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cultures, but rather creating a new form of aggregation of  states and peoples that 
identify  with a common citizenship  (Weiler, 1997: 287).
7  It is ‘the decoupling of 
nationality  and  citizenship  [that]  opens  the  possibility,  instead,  of  thinking  of  co-
existing multiple demoi’, conceived as simultaneously multiple identities ‘at different 
levels of intensity’ (Weiler, 1997: 287). 
A more effective protection of non-territorial minorities and the recognition of 
different cultural practices do not directly jeopardize the existence of the nation-state, 
since an umbrella identification exists in the shape of a European identity. A minority 
group, having no territory of reference, may be recognized and guaranteed autonomy, 
yet still not identify with one nation, though the general identification with Europe 
remains.  As  a  consequence,  this  general  identification  overcomes  the  problem  of 
national identification within states, while it goes beyond the paradigm of the nation-
state itself. 
 
Conclusion 
The  process  of  de-territorialization  is  not  simply  a  sociological  phenomenon  that 
affects economic systems through the migration of workers, creating international job 
markets  and  influencing  transnational  economies.  It  is  also  a  political  and  legal 
process that challenges national legal systems by introducing foreign elements into 
the geo-legal spaces of states. This phenomenon surely influences national identities 
by creating undefined social spaces for uprooted individuals who do not identify with 
the hosting state and preserve their identity by introducing new cultural elements. 
This  process  of  cultural  transformation  and  economic  trans-nationalization  has 
affected the realm of law as well, in that law is the means through which economic 
relations are defined and that establishes forms of coexistence. 
European states have to find appropriate solutions to the problem of recognizing 
foreign legal cultures that challenge the duty of the state to maintain certain legal 
standards  as  set  by  human  rights  law  and  constitutional  law.  As  a  consequence, 
European  states  face  the  challenge  of  regulating  the  degree  of  autonomy  and  the 
relation between the autonomous legal space within which individuals live, and the 
legal space of the states where these individuals reside. In other words, the problem 
originates from the integration of foreign institutions within a legal system in which 
they may not be recognized because they are contrary to the basic or fundamental JEMIE 2013, 1 
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principles of the legal space into which they are trying to settle. This problem may be 
solved  by  the  non-recognition  of  foreign  institutions  or  by  integration;  the  latter 
implies a mutual process of opening geo-legal frontiers by legal systems and a re-
elaboration of traditional legal cultures in accordance with European principles. The 
risks of legitimizing practices contrary to fundamental rights cannot be avoided by 
simple non-recognition, which causes self-segregation. If states reject the possibility 
of  recognizing  different  cultural  traditions,  including  legal  institutions,  then 
communities barricade themselves in order to perpetuate traditional cultural practices 
and  exploit  individual  rights  that  guarantee  basic  freedoms  to  the  detriment  of 
vulnerable groups. On the contrary, a process of recognition may avoid the creation of 
separate bodies, but both sides have to accept reasonable limits: traditional cultures 
have  to  accept  that  certain  cultural  practices  are  incompatible  with  European 
standards of human rights  and European  states  have to  actively  participate in  the 
process of cultural re-qualification by firmly asserting fundamental rights in order to 
eradicate internal restrictions, and, simultaneously, by accepting new diversity into 
their social and legal spaces. 
Beyond  legal  pluralism,  the  other  forms  of  non-territorial  protection  of 
minorities—communal cultural autonomy and political representation—guarantee the 
inclusion of minority groups in society. States may maintain their role as “homelands 
of  dominant  cultures”,  but  the  non-territorial  protection  of  minorities  opens  the 
possibility for diverse communities to create their own social space which, however, 
does not challenge the identification of one state with one dominant culture, since, 
ultimately, both dominant and minority cultures identify with one supra-identity. 
As previously noted, many  European legal  systems  have adopted models  of 
non-territorial autonomy. Nevertheless, these models are incomplete, or applied to 
deal with different communal requests and collective needs. In this sense, the millet 
system could serve as a valid model for the comprehensive protection of minority 
groups and collective rights through non-territorial arrangements. A European millet 
system could correct some of the negative aspects of its contemporary versions that 
are applied in the Middle East. Due to the increasing importance of non-territorial 
forms of minority protection, the millet system could serve as a model in Europe in 
adjudicating integrative and non-assimilative claims. Arguably, Europe is developing Quer, De-Territorializing Minority Rights in Europe 
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its own form of millet, but, through a more attentive analysis of the Middle Eastern 
experience, European states could learn lessons about diversity management. 
 
Notes 
 
1.  Specifically,  this paper refers to:  Lebanon,  since  it is  the  most  similar  system  to the 
Ottoman millet with powerful religious courts in matters of personal status and large 
autonomous ethno-religious groups in matters of cultural rights; Israel, since it is the only 
liberal  democracy  that  recognizes  collective  rights  in  terms  of  personal  and  cultural 
autonomy; and Iraq, where non-territorial autonomy has been constitutionalized alongside 
territorial federal-like arrangements. 
2.  This idea fosters the creation of “national versions” of Islamic law, which stem from the 
adaptation of shari’a to the legal systems of the states. In this respect, the local adaptation 
of Islamic law is a consequence of the development of what Bassam Tibi defines as Euro-
Islam, which combines Islamic culture with European tradition and principles. European 
versions of Islam are developing in different countries. A historical example is Albania, 
where, in 1923, the Islamic Congress decided to reform Islamic principles by banning 
polygamy and the compulsory use of the veil. 
3.  See OLG Köln, FamRZ, 1996: 1147 and OLG Düsseldorf, FamRZ, 1998: 1113. 
4.  The  text  of  the  law,  in  English  translation,  is  available  at: 
http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/cult_auton/. 
5.  The  training  courses  aim  to  develop  the application  of  a  critical  approach  to  Islamic 
theological studies. This approach was developed in German faculties of theology during 
the nineteenth century, as a result of rationalist theories of the Enlightenment. This new 
method privileged critical and rational approaches to the study of the Bible, in contrast 
with  dogmatic  theological  theories,  which  ultimately  supported  Christian  supremacy. 
Moreover, university training is thought of as a free heaven for those Islamic theologians 
who  already  apply  this  method  outside  Europe,  and  are  persecuted  in  obscurantist 
countries  under the  accusation  of  modernization,  hypocrisy,  heresy,  and  apostasy.  As 
Heneghan reports, ‘the “historical-critical method” of theology emerged in Germany in 
the 19th century as a rigorous academic examination of the Bible (Heneghan, 2010). It 
debunked many myths about Christian history and doctrine and explained how its holy 
book was constructed. The few theologians who apply this method to Islam keep a low 
profile because their findings are considered heretical by  mainstream Muslims. Some 
have been threatened with violence’. Other attempts to create training curricula for imams 
within European universities, such as in France and in the Netherlands, were unsuccessful 
because Christian theology departments ran the programmes. As a consequence, these 
educational  programmes  were  perceived  as  means  for  proselytizing,  rather  than 
programmes on Islamic theology. 
6.  A further problem arises with regard to the partner for dialogue. Who should be included 
in  these  institutions?  Should  radicals  be  isolated,  or  should  they  be  included  in  the 
negotiation processes? As Tarek Haggy argues, the problems that European states face 
with their Islamic minorities originate from the forms of dialogue they opt for. European 
states, according to Haggy, turned to a large variety of Islamic associations and Islamic 
leaders,  including  radicals,  who  are  legitimized  as  representatives  of  Islam.  This  all-
inclusive approach hinders Islamic communities in the development of a Europeanized 
version of Islam, in that Europe does not give prominence to moderate representatives 
who are more likely to negotiate and find compromise. While dialogue is necessary even 
with those who engage in confrontational relationships with hosting states, Heggy argues 
that the institutions promoting dialogue should be composed for the majority of moderate 
leaders, so that radicals would be isolated. See the essays by Tarek Heggy available at 
http://www.tarek-heggy.com/index.html.  JEMIE 2013, 1 
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7.  Weiler explains that the idea of Europe is not about nations but about peoples. The author 
compares European identity with American Republicanism and with Habermas’ notion of 
constitutional  patriotism.  On  the  one  hand,  European  identity  differs  from  American 
Republican identity since the former does not aim to build a melting-pot nation or a new 
nation  united  by  flag  or  language.  On  the  other  hand,  it  goes  beyond  Habermas’ 
constitutional patriotism since unity is not only based on civic values and overarching 
rights and principles, but also on shared cultural practices and common cultural history. 
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